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T
he Federal Reserve has aggressively confronted the
ongoing recession by cutting the federal funds rate
target to a range between zero and 25 basis points
and implementing a number of quantitative credit-easing
policies. Yields on Treasury bills and notes have decreased
sharply in response both to these actions and to weak eco-
nomic activity. As shown in the chart, decreases in short-
term yields preceded those in longer-term yields. Short-
term yields on 90-day Treasuries fell from approximately 5
percent to less than 0.25 percent; later, longer-term yields
(10-year) decreased to below 3 percent.
Lower long-term market yields are instrumental to the
goals of an expansionary monetary policy. But Treasury
yields are unusual because there is no default risk; this low-
ering of Treasury yields needs to be transmitted to yields
on other securities. How  ever, this transmission from the
long-end of the Treasury yield curve to securities such as
corporate bonds and mort-
gages has proven more diffi-
cult than in previous reces-
sions. Corporate and mort-
gage-backed yields contain a
default-risk premium that is
reflected in a positive yield
spread over Treasury securi-
ties. A larger-than-usual risk
premium may cause a weak
response in private yields. The
U.S. corporate bond market
is large, with $9.8 trillion in
outstanding debt—1.5 times
the amount of outstanding
Treasuries. The U.S. mortgage
market is even bigger—$14.7
trillion at the end of 2008, of
which $8.2 trillion is securi-
tized. Given the size of the
underlying markets, cutting
the cost of capital to firms
and households by reducing
the yields required on long-term corporate bonds and
mortgages is a key policy objective. The top panel of the
chart shows that yields have decreased little so far in this
recession. On the contrary, the spreads between both invest-
ment (Aaa)- and speculative (Baa)-grade corporate bond
and Treasury note yields have skyrocketed to unprecedented
levels.1 For instance, the spreads between 8- to 15-year
mortgage-backed securities and 10-year Treasury notes
surged from a mean of approximately 1.7 percent to 7 per-
cent between August 2007 and March 2009, with a peak in
excess of 8 percent after October 2008. The questionable
creditworthiness of the issuing firms does not appear to
be the main factor behind the recent spread increases: The
spread on Aaa corporate bonds—i.e., debt with minimal
chance of default—has also increased. For instance, since
October 2008 the spreads on Aaa corporate bonds have
exceeded 2.5 percent—double historical means.
Taming the Long-Term Spreads
Massimo Guidolin, Assistant Vice President and Economist
Yu Man Tam, Senior Research Associate
Aaa Minus 10-Year Treasury
Baa Minus 10-Year Treasury


















00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Yield (percent)
Yield (percent)Lowering long-term yields across a spectrum of instru-
ments is clearly one of the priorities for policymakers. It is
well known that credit spreads tend to widen in recessions,
but the recent spikes appear to be anomalous and related to
the financial turmoil and not to business cycle conditions.
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that despite
the apparent success of quantitative easing in reducing long-
term Treasury yields from 5 percent to less than 3 percent,
the reduction in the long-term cost of capital perceived by
firms and households may be modest if, at the same time,
the spreads on other long-term bonds stay abnormally ele-
vated by as much as 150 basis points. Removing conditions
of impairment in the broad U.S. financial markets to favor
a decline in credit spreads is a prerequisite to shortening
the ongoing recession. ￿
1 Long-term corporate bond yields are from Moody’s. Data for 8- to 15-year
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), computed by averaging the yields of private-
label securities with ratings higher than BB, are from Bloomberg/Bear Stearns.
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Given the size of the underlying
markets, cutting the cost of capital 
to firms and households by reducing
the yields required on long-term 
corporate bonds and mortgages 
is a key policy objective.